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Religion and Brexit : Populism and the Church of England 
Abstract 
 
Drawing on our own recent surveys on beliefs and values in Great Britain (Woodhead) and evangelical 
Christians in the UK (Smith) as well as those of others, this paper explores the links between religion  and 
views and votes on leaving or remaining in the EU in the UK's 2016 referendum. Analysis of data 
commissioned by Woodhead and gathered by YouGov shortly after the referendum (n= 3243) allows us 
to test associations between religious identity and behaviour and attitudes relevant to the EU Referendum, 
while controlling for other demographic variables. The main finding is that identifying as Church of 
England (Anglican) was an important independent predictor of voting Leave even when other relevant 
factors like age and region were corrected for. By contrast self-defined English evangelicals  (from an 
opportunity sample of 1198 collected and analysed by Smith) appear to be more pro-EU and generally 
internationalist in outlook. Previous surveys by Woodhead of religion and values in the UK allow us to 
provide some explanations for these findings, and for the striking difference of UK and US Evangelicals - 
81% of whom supported Donald Trump in the 2016 US Election. The paper ends with reflections on 
whether the term ‘populist’ can be usefully applied to the evangelical pro-Trump vote in the USA or the 
Church of England pro-Brexit vote in the UK, concluding that it can for the former but not for the latter.  
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On June 23rd 2016 a referendum was held on the United Kingdom's continuing membership of the 
European Union.  The key issues in the campaign were immigration, national sovereignty, the EU’s 
‘democratic deficit’ and the advantages and disadvantages to the British economy. The turnout was high 
at 72% (47m), with more people turning out to vote than in the previous year's general election. The result 
was that the British voted to leave the EU by 52% to 48%.  In Scotland 63% voted to remain, in Northern 
Ireland 56% (and in London 60%),  but in Wales and every other region of England there was a majority 
for leave of between 52% and 59%  (see Table 1). Much analysis of the vote has been carried out 
examining in detail the strong correlations with age and geography in particular,1 as for example in Lord 
Ashcroft' s exit poll (2016) of a sample of over 12,000 voters,2 but there has so far been little polling or 
analysis of whether and how religion and denominational affiliation among Christians affected this 
outcome: this paper fills that gap.3    
***** INSERT TABLE 1 **** 
Religion in the Brexit Vote: the importance of Anglican identity 
Woodhead commissioned data on religion from YouGov’s referendum exit poll of voters. In total 3,243 
respondents were surveyed; the sample is weighted and representative of the adult population in the 
United Kingdom. Because of the distinctive patterns of voting between the different nations of the UK, 
each of which also has a different religious history, we have based our analysis in this paper on the 
respondents resident in England (n=2,769) (in what follows the terms ‘England’ and ‘Britain’/‘UK’ are 
used deliberately to signal the unit being referred to).  
***** INSERT TABLE 2**** 
Table 2 shows the proportions of remain and leave voters for five religious categories. While it is 
evident that a majority of those whose religious affiliation is Christian voted to leave the EU (and in 
slightly greater proportions than the English electorate as a whole) and that those who had no religion or 
were from another faith voted by a slight majority to remain, what is most striking is that those who 
 4 
identified affiliated as ‘Church of England, CofE, or Anglican’ (synonyms on the survey) voted by two to 
one for Brexit. By contrast, Roman Catholics were more likely to vote Remain than Leave.  
 
Lord Ashcroft’s ‘How Did you Vote? Referendum poll has similar findings, with all religions 
except Christianity (including ‘nones’) having a majority in favour of  Remain, but unlike ours this data 
has no breakdown of Christian by denomination.4 A newspaper article by Trevor Phillips (2017) discusses 
Brexit by denomination but draws (we think) on Woodhead’s data and reports the same finding about the 
significance of Anglican identity for pro-Brexit voting. Because of the doubt about its independence it 
cannot be used for corroboration.5   
 
Before drawing firm conclusions about the significance of religion for Brexit it is necessary to 
control for the influence of other demographic variables, including age and area of residence which 
proved such important factors in the Referendum.  This is important because we know, for example, that 
Anglicans are typically older than that of the population as a whole, whereas ‘nones’ (those reporting ‘no 
relgion’) are typically younger (Woodhead 2016).   
 
***** INSERT TABLE 3 **** 
 
Table 3 breaks down Brexit-voting Anglicans and nones by various demographic variables, and 
by how they voted in the 2015 General Election. It compares them with the population of England as a 
whole. The figures confirm that gender, age, political orientation, living in or outside the London region, 
social class and previous voting preference are all associated with  the referendum vote.  Nevertheless, 
what is so striking is that in every group Anglicans are more likely than average to vote leave, while 
nones are more likely to vote to remain. 
 
In order to control for the interactions of these variables where there is some degree of co-
linearity, a logistic regression model was applied with the aim of predicting the separate contribution of 
each variable to the probability of voting ‘leave’. The model shows that age plays the greatest role, 
followed by social class, and living outside London. However, identifying as CofE still emerges as a 
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highly significant factor. (Details of the model can be seen in Table 10 in the appendix.) It is also worth 
considering the matter another way round: taking affiliation to the Church of England as the dependent 
variable and examining which other variables in the dataset best predict this particular religious identity. 
The second logistic regression model (see Table 11 in appendix) suggests that age is the best predictor, 
but that being a leave voter, and being a woman all significantly raise the probability of calling oneself 
CofE. Interestingly social class and living in or outside the capital do not show a significant effect.  
 
In short: identifying as ‘Church of England’ is a major independent predictor of voting Brexit. 
The effect remains even when all other factors are controlled for.  Anglicans in England had a serious 
impact on the Referendum result.  
Religiosity – the role of church attendance 
The information about religion from Woodhead’s YouGov poll presented so far is based on a single 
response to a survey question about religious affiliation. We can also explore other indicators of 
religiosity, such as frequent attendance at worship, being employed by the church, and identifying 
strongly as an evangelical Christian. We have for this purpose two data sets from surveys conducted in 
the period immediately before the referendum, Woodhead’s YouGov poll of 4018 GB adults 
commissioned for the Westminster Faith Debates in June 2013, and a panel survey for the Evangelical 
Alliance from Spring 2016. 
***** INSERT TABLE  4 **** 
 
Table 4  shows how people in 2013 said they would vote if there were to be a EU Referendum (although 
mooted, the Referendum was not called until February 2016; Woodhead asked the question in order to 
gauge attitudes and values at that time). The result was strongly in favour of leaving the EU, and the 
breakdown by religious affiliation showed that those who identify as Anglican were significantly more in 
favour of leaving than any other religious group. Apart from nones, the other religious groups do not have 
large enough samples to draw serious conclusions, but ‘Other Christian’ denominations and Sikhs were at 
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this stage showing a majority in favour of leave; Jewish voters and Nones too close to call; Hindus, 
Muslims and Buddhists in favour of remaining in the EU. 
 
***** INSERT TABLE  5 **** 
  
Using this 2013 survey we can also see whether regular church attendance amongst Anglicans 
(representative sample) and Catholics (smaller sample) makes a difference to (predicted) voting for 
Brexit. Table 5 shows that regular church attendance reduces the likelihood of voting to leave, though a 
majority of churchgoing Anglicans (55%) still say they would vote this way.  
English Evangelicals and Brexit 
Our data on Evangelical Christians comes from the 21st Century Evangelicals research programme carried 
out since 2010 by the Evangelical Alliance (Smith 2015). The research programme takes the form of a 
quarterly online survey on various topics of relevance to Christians. It is completed by a panel of 
volunteers recruited through the membership and networks of the Evangelical Alliance. Typically around 
4000 people are invited by email with about 70% of  respondents to the preceding wave and 30% of the 
total pool of contacts responding. Further open invitations via social media recruit  a few hundred 
additional respondents in each wave of the survey. While this is a self-selecting opportunity sample and 
cannot be taken as truly representative of any known and enumerated population of evangelicals it is 
organized by the organization which is widely recognized as representing the largest and broadest 
constituency of evangelicals in the UK. Regular monitoring suggests a consistent demography in the 
sample in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, social class, places of residence and church denomination.  
 
The data about referendum voting intentions comes from a question included in a wave of the 
panel survey carried out in March 2016 and is based on the replies of 1198 self-identifying evangelicals 
living in England.  Of this sample 93%  identify their ethnicity as ‘White British’.  They have a high 
average age with 58% having been born before 1960, 32% in the 1960s or 1970s, and only 10% since 
1980. They tend to be committed and active Christians and regular churchgoers and they are drawn from 
a wide range of Christian denominations including at least a third who belong to the Church of England. 
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Although a specific question about social class was not asked in this particular wave it is clear 
from earlier  survey waves reported in Smith (2015, pp. 21-22) that the panel is predominantly middle to 
upper class. In the ‘Working faithfully?’ survey in May 2013, 24% were higher professionals and a 
further 47% intermediate professionals. In the ‘Do we value education?’ survey in November 2012  70% 
had a university degree and 41% had postgraduate qualifications. This probably reflects the socio-
economic profile of evangelicals in Britain more generally. While no question about political affiliation 
was asked in March 2016 an earlier wave of the survey immediately after the May 2015 general election 
found that  31% of English evangelicals voted Conservative, 25% Labour, 17% Liberal Democrat, 11.5% 
UKIP and 8% Green. 
***** INSERT TABLE  6 **** 
 
Table 6 shows the EU Referendum voting intentions expressed by the evangelical panel and 
shows a small absolute majority (51% of those who had already decided) were intending to vote remain. 
Even though this question was asked at least two months before the actual referendum it is highly 
unlikely that a late swing among these English evangelicals would have brought them into line with the 
electorate as a whole. They appear to be considerably more internationalist than Anglicans in their 
outlook, which is remarkable given their age profile.  This was underlined in the survey wave on politics 
prior to the 2015 general election in which immigration to the UK was only seen as the most important 
single issue by 6% percent of evangelicals compared with 21%  in the population at large (EA 2015). 
 
While the format of the data made it difficult to apply regression modelling, cross-tabulations of 
the data showed statistically significant differences (which tended to reflect the breakdown of the national 
electorate) in the panel for : 
1. gender 30% of the men said they intend to vote leave compared with 23% of women, 
although importantly 25% of women compared to 17% of men were undecided. 
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2. Age group Older evangelicals (in line with the whole electorate) were more likely than 
younger ones to support Brexit, though even among the over 55's there was still a large 
majority intending to vote remain.  
3. Denomination Pentecostals were the only denominational group where more respondents 
intended to vote ‘leave’ than ‘remain’. In contrast with the YouGov poll Anglicans with only 
20% supporting ‘leave’ were the least Eurosceptic. 
4. Region Evangelicals in London had the highest proportion of ‘remain’ supporters  at 59%, 
followed by 57% in Yorkshire and the Humber, while the East Midlands had the highest 
number of ‘leave’ supporters, but still reaching only 35%.  
Comparison with the USA 
In November 2017 the United States of America held a General Election for the Presidency and the 
members of Congress. Following a long selection process the Republicans nominated a maverick outsider 
candidate who had never before held any elected public office, Donald J. Trump. Running against the 
Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton, a career politician and former First Lady and Secretary of State, on 
a turnout of 54%, he gained 62,979,636 votes (46%) of the popular vote nationwide compared with her 
65,844,610 votes (48.1%). However because of the structure of the Electoral College, mandated on a 
State by State basis, and as a result of his strong showing in important key ‘swing’ states, Trump was 
elected President by 306 College votes to 232 and was inaugurated as President on January 20th 2017. As 
in the UK, much analysis of the breakdown of the voting, largely based on exit or post referendum 
polling, has been carried out examining in detail the geography, demography and political loyalties and 
attitudes of voters on each side. Unlike the UK, attention has also been given to religion.  
 
In the US presidential election the geographical distribution of the vote suggested that Clinton 
and Democratic voters were concentrated in the metropolitan areas of the east and west coasts while the 
Republican victory was secured by majorities in mainly rural, small-town and post-industrial areas of 
middle America (Brilliant Maps 2016) . Exit polls reported by the New York Times  (2016) and the Pew 
Foundation (2016)  show that race, gender, age and  education were key factors. White non-Hispanic 
voters preferred Trump over Clinton by 21 percentage points (58% to 37%), women supported Clinton 
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over Trump by 54% to 42% while men supported Trump over Clinton by 53% to 41%. College graduates 
backed Clinton by a 9-point margin (52%-43%), while those without a college degree backed Trump 
52%-44%. Young adults preferred Clinton over Trump by a wide 55%-37% margin while older voters 
(65+) preferred Trump over Clinton by 53%-45%.  All these patterns find some echo in what happened in 
England over Brexit. 
As for religion, regularly-practising Christians support Trump in greater proportions than 
average with support rising to over 80% among white Evangelicals or ‘born-again’ believers (Pew 2017). 
Smith and Martinez (Pew 2017) analyse the religious breakdown of the US vote and find that ‘fully eight-
in-ten self-identified white, born-again/evangelical Christians say they voted for Trump, while just 16% 
voted for Clinton. Trump’s 65-percentage-point margin of victory among voters in this group – which 
includes self-described Protestants, as well as Catholics, Mormons and others – matched or exceeded the 
victory margins of George W. Bush in 2004, John McCain in 2008 and Mitt Romney in 2012.’  
***** INSERT TABLE  7  **** 
 
Table 7 shows that US Christians (especially Protestants, White Catholics and Mormons) are 
less likely than Jewish people, those of other faiths and ‘nones’ to support the more progressive, liberal-
internationalist option on the ballot paper.  We have seen that much the same is true in England, where 
Christians, of whom Anglicans make up the largest share, are more likely to favour Brexit than are 
‘nones’ and other faiths.  But a striking difference is that white evangelicals and regular churchgoers in 
the USA (who are of course a much more important voting bloc than in the UK) are overwhelmingly 
conservative politically and more likely to support Trump, whereas in England evangelicals and more 
regular churchgoers are less likely to support Brexit than traditional ‘cool’ Anglicans. English 
evangelicals and frequent churchgoers are spread along the political spectrum but tend to be centrist or 
left-leaning liberal-progressive politically, whereas US evangelicals are firmly conservative and 
Republican.  It is also notable that US nones are overwhelmingly Democrat, whereas UK nones are 
distributed across the political spectrum from moderate left-wing to moderate right-wing in much the 
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same way as the British population as a whole, with under a third being left-leaning, just under a third 
right-leaning, and the rest – a plurality – being centrist (Woodhead 2016).   
 
The Evangelical Vote in the US and UK Compared  
In both the USA and UK Protestant Christians were more likely to support Trump or Brexit respectively 
and in both countries they made a difference to the outcome of the votes. In the UK, however, it was 
religiously ‘cool’ Anglicans who made the difference rather than religiously enthusiastic evangelicals, 
whereas in the USA it was the other way round: here it was enthusiastic, churchgoing Christians – above 
all evangelicals – who made the difference. So, besides the fact that evangelicals make up a larger 
proportion of the Christian vote in the US and Anglicans make up a larger proportion in the UK, why the 
difference between the evangelicals in each country?  
One answer could be that US evangelicals (and perhaps English Anglicans) set aside their 
religion when they voted for Trump, and voted largely out of economic self-interest.  This is certainly 
what some evangelical leaders thought, several of whom opposed Trump and his agenda on theological 
grounds and told their (disobendient) followers to show their faith by doing the same. (Similarly, 
Anglicans ignored their pro-Remain bishops and archbishops.) There may well be truth in this, but it pulls 
apart religion, culture, politics and class too starkly.  
A better answer has to do with important historic differences between evangelicals in the two 
countries (apart from evangelicals much larger size and influence in the USA). One is difference in socio-
economic profile. Evangelicalism in the USA is grounded in a tradition of populist revivalism which 
means that those who identify as evangelicals are still likely to be a people of lower social status, in 
contrast to the mainly middle class evangelicals in the UK  (Niebuhr 1954; Schwadel 2014).  In addition, 
there is a difference in ethnic profile and outlook. The legacy of slavery and segregation mean African 
American churches and white evangelical churches inhabit distinct social and political territory. Whites 
are more likely to identify the USA as God's chosen or covenant people (Longley 2003) and therefore to 
conflate nationalism and the kingdom of God  (Hummel  2016). For a variety of reasons, including its 
long history of international mission work and strong connection with Christians of the post-colonial 
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diasporas who have settled in British cities, the culture and ethos of English evangelicalism is more 
ecumenical and internationalist. Finally, there is a difference in political profile. Since the 1980s there has 
been an intentional movement to identify the evangelical churches in the USA with the Republican party 
(Schwadel 2016). The so-called moral majority with its concern for family values such as marriage, 
patriarchy, and opposition to abortion and LGBT rights has created a climate where voting for a female, 
liberal progressive, pro-choice candidate such as Hillary Clinton was seen as tantamount to apostasy. By 
contrast in the UK, even though evangelicals in the  UK are generally conservative and illiberal on issues 
of sexual morality, the family and abortion, these issues do not ally with a political party as they do in the 
USA.6 
Thus, as an affluent and well-educated constituency with a rather cosmopolitan outlook, it would 
not be surprising that many British evangelicals saw their economic and cultural interests as being better 
served by remaining in the European Union than in putting Britain, let alone England, first, whereas in the 
USA evangelicals’ ethnic, cultural and economic interests were more obviously served by Trump than 
Clinton.  
 
Why did Anglicans Vote Brexit? 
If US evangelicals voted for Trump because he was perceived to support their moral stance, political 
stance, socio-economic and ethnic interests and sense of (traduced) historic entitlement and identity, why 
did English Anglicans vote Brexit, and were there equivalent reasons? In answering this question we will 
rely chiefly on the several surveys of Anglican attitudes carried out by Woodhead between 2013 and 2015 
(representative samples of the UK, excluding Northern Ireland).7  
 
***** INSERT TABLE  8 **** 
***** INSERT TABLE  9 **** 
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Even though it sounds tautological, it is worth emphasizing that the main reason Anglicans 
supported Brexit was hostility to the EU, the latter being widely perceived as an overly-bureaucratic and 
‘interfering’ body without sufficient democratic accountability. Table 8 shows that a huge proportion of 
Anglicans (over three-quarters) agree that there are ‘too many EU laws and regulations’ whereas a ‘mere’ 
two-thirds of British people agree. This is Anglicans’ strongest objection to the EU, and Table 9 ramsthe 
point home by showing that a full quarter of Anglicans say that they ‘do not think there have been any 
advantages from the UK’s membership of the EU’ – not even easier travel!   
A further, related, reason for ‘Anglican Brexit’ has to do with cultural and ethnic pride. When 
those who take a positive view of  the Church of England were asked what they most value about it, the 
top three answers had nothing to do with God or religion, but were (in order) that it is ‘integral to English 
culture’, ‘an ethical voice in society’, and ‘past of our heritage’.  Most English Anglicans refer to 
themselves not as Anglican (which refers to a global communion of churches) but as ‘CofE’ or ‘Church 
of England’. These attitudes go back a long way. The CofE is inseparable from the development of the 
English nation, monarchy, language, people, culture and mores: they have co-evolved for five centuries. 
Until recently, to be CofE was simply to be born English – and legally it still is. As a result the default 
religious identity for many English people who consider themselves Christian, even if they do not 
practice their religion by attending worship very often, has always been CofE.  This is a matter of 
ethnicity and social respectability as well as religion per se. The CofE has long been the church of the 
social elites and the establishment as well as aspiring lower classes, and has long had a conservative lean 
(large and small ‘cs’), despite having some very left-wing elements within it and having played a key role 
in the development of the welfare state (Clements, 2015). By contrast the ‘non-conformists’, including 
many of the ancestors of today’s evangelicals, were historically more likely to be politically Liberal 
(before the decline of that party) and support social change. Catholics in contrast, with membership drawn 
in large numbers from working class Irish -- and in more recent years European  migrants – have tended 
to support the trade unions and the Labour Party and, as members of a church that is self-consciously 
global in scope, to be more internationalist in outlook.   
This English Anglican cultural-ethnic pride has as its other side negative attitudes to 
immigration. As Table 9 shows, this concern is not as great as concern about EU laws and regulations, but 
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there is nevertheless great concern about illegal immigration and about ‘too many people from the rest of 
the EU coming to work in Britain’. Anglicans are significantly more concerned about these things than 
the general British population. Because Anglicans are spread across the classes, and because most are 
older, this does not seem to be a concern solely about their own economic livelihood, but a wider concern 
about culture. This is confirmed by a question which asked whether people thought it was better to live in 
Britain when more people shared a common culture’, to which 60 percent of Anglicans said ‘yes’ 
compared with 48 percent of the population as a whole. There may be an element of colour-racism at play 
here as well, given that Anglicans are disproportionately white, but that is not what people say, and 
overtly racist political parties do not have much support in Britain, nor a particular link to Anglicanism 
(Marzouki, McDonnell, and  Roy, 2016).  
So against the urgings of their bishops and archbishops (who are predominantly evangelical in 
orientation), English Anglicans voted in large numbers to Leave the EU.8  Their refusal to listen to their 
bishops was an indication of the division which now exists between grassroots and leadership in almost 
all areas of Church teaching, and which at least in relation to Brexit extends to a refusal to listen to 
political and economic leaders as well (Brown and Woodhead 2016).   
 
Is the Christian vote ‘Populist’? 
Our evidence has shown that, despite being largely ignored in the UK, Christianity played an important 
role in the Brexit vote (as well as the election of Donald Trump), but that it looked different in each 
country.  In the USA white evangelicals voted for Trump and influenced the outcome; in the UK 
Anglicans, not evangelicals, voted for Brexit and influenced the outcome. Despite the differences, does 
this mean that Protestant Christianity can be said to have played a ‘populist’ role in both countries?  
Since these two events ‘populism’ has become a buzz word which, at its worst, is used 
pejoratively by those who are strongly opposed to the outcome of both of these votes, and who hold the 
voters responsible to be morally reprehensible (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013). This usage is most 
common amongst those whom their opponents equally pejoratively dub ‘liberals’. These ‘liberals’ 
regularly conflate populism with mob rule, illiberalism, opposition to democracy, xenophobia, 
parochialism and nativism, and the far right (in fact populism exists on the right and the left, Bonikowski, 
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2016). From this ‘liberal’ point of view, the Christian vote in both countries is assumed to be populist and 
to display the negative characteristics associated with that term – an easy assumption for those who 
already view religion as a retrograde and oppressive force.  
Fortunately there are now a number of political analyses and socio-cultural analyses of 
‘populism’ which allow us to take the concept seriously but use it in a more critical way: standing back 
from the ongoing struggles rather than re-running their scripts. From this literature there has emerged a 
significant agreement about three defining  characteristics of contemporary populism: a dualism between 
the people and the elite, a strong leader (or party, or movement), and a commitment to democracy but not 
to the institutions and processes of liberal democracy. By looking at each in turn we can gauge whether 
the Christian vote counts as populist.   
The distinction between the people and the elite does a great deal of work in populism (Aydın-
Düzgit and Keyman, 2017; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2015). It is politically useful because it is very 
flexible: the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ can have many different meanings. The ‘people’, for example, can 
mean the voting populus/the common people, the ‘natives’, the nation – or some combination.  
The use of this distinction is clearly important within both pro-Trump evangelicalism and pro-
Brexit Anglicanism. For the latter, however, the ‘elite’ is much more circumscribed: above all the EU and 
its bureaucrats who are seen to be out of touch with the people and the various nations of the EU, outside 
democratic control by ordinary people. The ‘elite’ can also encompass all those business and political and 
religious leaders (i.e. the majority of them) who instructed the British to vote Remain and predicted doom 
and disaster if they did not. They included Barack Obama, the Governor of the Bank of England, the then 
Prime Minister David Cameron and the Archbishops of Canterbury and York. In other words, the EU 
referendum did not just tap into an existing sense of an ‘us and them’, it helped to create one. 
If the ‘elite’ for Anglicans are primarily ‘EU bureaucrats’ and their supporters, then who are the 
‘people’?  They cannot be ‘the common people’ simply in class terms, because Anglicans cover the class 
spectrum and their church has a middle- and upper-class reputation. They could be 'ordinary people like 
us' and the could also be ‘the nation’, in this case England. The latter idea gains support from the very 
name ‘Church of England’ and its long association with the English nation. It is the established church: 
Anglicans still pray regularly for the Queen and the nation, and all their clergy have to swear allegiance to 
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the monarch. The polling cited above shows that many Anglicans have a deep commitment to English 
culture and heritage, and their religion is in many ways an ethnic religion (something which British 
evangelicals with their more global and missionary outlook tend to reject). However, caution is needed 
before concluding that Anglicans and their vote are ‘nationalist’ if that implies that they have some sort of 
political nationalist agenda equivalent to Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’. Anglican nationalism 
doesn’t fit this mould, in fact localism and/or regionalism may be more important in the Brexit vote than 
nationalism (hence the strongly regional nature of the Brexit vote, and a growing reassertion of 
‘northernness’ and other regional identities, along with resentment at concentration of power in London 
and the SouthEast). Loyalties in the Church of England are as much to the locality/parish as the nation, 
and the two are often combined (England visualized as the village green and parish church, for example).  
This fits well with David Goodhart’s (2017) analysis where he suggests that the Brexit vote makes the 
division between those sections of the population who hold an identity tightly linked to ‘somewhere’ and 
those more mobile sections who can happily live and belong ‘anywhere’. 
So Anglican Brexiters appear to have been defending a cultural and ethnic identity against 
perceived threats. We have noted their dislike of illegal immigration and a loss of control of national 
(British) borders. Here there is a clear overlap with the vote for Trump. In the USA there was anxiety  
about Mexicans and other immigrants taking jobs, committing acts of terrorism, and undermining culture; 
in the UK it was more about eastern Europeans and Muslims taking jobs, drawing on the overstretched 
welfare system, committing acts of terrorism, and undermining ‘our’ culture. Politicians’ (national and 
EU) refusal to take these concerns seriously, partly because of the commercial sector’s desire for cheap 
foreign labour, all helped fuel a reaction amongst both Christians and non-Christians in Britain.  
So in terms of the elite/people distinction, the Christian vote in both the US and UK seems to 
qualify as populist, albeit in interestingly different ways. In other respects, however, the populist label is 
much harder to pin to Anglican Brexit.  
It is not associated with a strong leader, or political party, or movement – all of which are said to 
be defining of populism by (e.g. Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2015, p.43).  On the contrary, Anglican Brexit 
rejected its own leaders’ pleas to Remain, and the politicians associated with Brexit could hardly be called 
charismatic ‘strong men’. The only figure who even partly fits this role was Nigel Farage, the leader of 
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UKIP. Though he and his party tended not to make overt appeals to Christianity,  Anglicans  were 
somewhat more likely to vote  UKIP in the 2015 General Election (18% compared with 13% of the 
country as a whole).  The majority of  Anglicans are Conservative, with Theresa May with her solid CofE 
credentials their natural leader: anyone less like a strong and charismatic populist leader, or indeed ‘one 
of the people’ is hard to imagine.  Donald Trump, of course, fits the bill rather better.9  
Finally, Anglican Brexit is not critical of liberal democracy and the democratic process in the 
way that populism is. Here again Trump and his supporters seem much closer to type. As several 
commentators point out, populism seems to have an integral connection with democracy, but as Mudde, 
and Kaltwasser (2013) clarify, it is at one with the participatory aspect of democracy (rule by the people), 
but critical of the liberal aspect of democracy (protection of the freedoms – including those of minorities 
by liberal instruments and procedures like a free press and an independent judiciary).  There is much less 
attack on liberal institutions and processes in the UK than in the USA currently, and there is little 
evidence that Anglicans are opposed to liberal democracy and its historic institutions. Indeed, as we have 
seen, the most popular Anglican reason given for voting Leave was to protect British freedoms and 
institutions against ‘meddling’ bureaucrats.  Thus in terms of its second and third main characteristics, the 
claim that Anglican Brexit is populist fails.  
Conclusion  
The religious vote played a significant role in both Donald Trump’s victory in 2017 and the Brexit vote in 
2016. In both cases support came from Protestant Christians, but the profile of those voters and their 
concerns was very different. In the USA evangelicals played the lead role, in the UK it was Anglicans 
(because of a different history and profile, evangelicals in Britain were more likely to vote Remain). In 
the USA the Christian vote fits the description of populism far better than in the UK: it follows a strong 
leader, is critical of many of the liberal elements of democracy, and it contrasts the good, Godly people 
and an untrustworthy elite. By contrast, Brexit-supporting Anglicans defend liberal democracy against 
EU incursions and have no leader, party or movement. The only feature of populism they share is a 
defence of their ethno-religious identity and heritage against elites whom they believe to be indifferent or 
hostile to them. The Anglican vote for Brexit does not qualify as ‘populist’ in the way the evangelical 
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*****insert tables 10 and 11 here 
 







Votes Proportion of votes 





39,005,781 73.0% 13,266,996 15,188,406 46.7% 53.3% 
Northern Ireland 
 
1,260,955 62.7% 440,707 349,442 55.8% 44.2% 
Scotland 
 
3,987,112 67.2% 1,661,191 1,018,322 62.0% 38.0% 
Wales 
 
2,270,272 71.7% 772,347 854,572 47.5% 52.50% 
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Table 2. Brexit Vote by Religion (England) (Woodhead/YouGov June 2016).  
 
Faith group Remain Leave N 
no religion 
 
53% 47% 1224 
CofE 
 
34% 66% 733 
Roman Catholic 
 
45% 55% 200 
Other Christian 
 
46% 55% 146 
other faith 
 
51% 49% 136 
Total 
 
46% 54% 2439 
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Table 3. Percent of Anglicans and Nones voting Leave by demographic characteristic and 2015 vote 
(Woodhead/YouGov June 2016).  
 
         All (England)         CofE         None 
All 54% 66% 47% 
    
Gender    
Male 51% 64% 45% 
Female 57% 68% 50% 
 
Social Class  
   
AB 45% 63% 36% 
C1 47% 63% 39% 
C2 63% 70% 59% 
DE 66% 71% 66% 
Age Group    
Born since 1980 37.00% 49% 35% 
Born 1960s-70 57% 66% 53% 
Born before 1960 66% 72% 60% 
Region    
Out of London 55% 68% 49% 
London 41% 57% 35% 
    
Leave by voting 
preference in the 
2015 General 
Election 
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Voted Conservative 60% 66% 58% 
Voted Labour 33% 49% 26% 
Voted Liberal 
Democrat  
35% 40% 28% 
Voted UKIP 98% 99% 96% 





Table 4. Voting intentions by religious affiliation (Woodhead for Westminster Faith Debates/You 
Gov, June 2013, n=4018)  
      
      









I would vote for 
Britain to remain a 
member of the 
European Union 
I would vote 









Church of England/Anglican/Episcopal 26% 57% 4% 13% 1120 
United Reformed Church 26% 57% 0% 17% 20 
Baptist 36% 51% 0% 13% 43 
Presbyterian/Church of Scotland 36% 51% 4% 10% 82 
Overall average 33% 47% 5% 15% 4018 
Roman Catholic 36% 46% 3% 15% 260 
Methodist 33% 45% 3% 19% 91 
Sikh 29% 43% 5% 24% 87 
None 37% 41% 6% 16% 1550 
Jewish 41% 41% 5% 12% 156 
Other 32% 41% 6% 21% 154 
Hindu 38% 35% 4% 24% 93 
Islam/Muslim 36% 34% 8% 22% 243 
Buddhist 42% 31% 4% 23% 24 
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Prefer not to say 26% 25% 10% 38% 88 





Table 5. Leave vote by regular church attenders (CofE and RC)  
(Woodhead for Westminster Faith Debates/You Gov, June 2013, n=4018) 
Frequency of attending  
% of  those expressing a view 
(excluding don't know and won’t vote) 





attends at least once a month 
I would vote for Britain to 
leave the European Union 
50% 55% 41% 
N  10 106 54 
     
 
attends less often 
 
I would vote for Britain to 
leave the European Union 
52% 69% 56% 
N  1219 830 156 
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Table 6. EU voting intention, evangelicals in England  (Evangelical Alliance What is 
Evangelicalism? Survey - Spring 2016) 
 
In the forthcoming 
referendum on 
Britain's place in 
Europe how are you 
likely to vote? 
 













 All   N 608 320 262 1190 7 
Response Percent 51% 27% 22%   
      
 By Gender      
 Male 52% 30% 18% 710  
 Female 50% 23% 27% 476  
       
 By Age Group    N  
 born before 1960 47% 31% 22% 683  
 born 60s or 70s 54% 24% 22% 384  
 born after 1980 67% 8% 25% 119  
     1186 11 
 
By Denomination 
 (main 6) 
     
 Pentecostal 31% 46% 23% 52  
 Charismatic independent 46% 32% 22% 213  
 Free Church 47% 28% 23% 94  
 Baptist 56% 27% 17% 237  
 Other evangelical 48% 25% 27% 130  
 Anglican 57% 20% 23% 409  
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 By Region      
 London 59% 22% 19% 159  
 South-east England, 50% 30% 20% 257  
 East Anglia 53% 24% 23% 124  
 East Midlands 45% 35% 21% 112  
 West Midlands 52% 27% 21% 105  
 South-west England 44% 28% 29% 189  
 North-west England 53% 26% 22% 120  
 North-east England 51% 24% 24% 37  
 
Yorkshire and the 
Humber 





Table 7. US Presidential Election voting by religion (Pew 2017, how the faithful voted)  
 
  Clinton  Trump 
Protestant / Other Christian  39% 58% 
 
Catholic 45% 52% 
White Catholic 37% 60% 
Hispanic Catholic 67% 26% 
Jewish 71% 24% 
Other Faiths 62% 29% 
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Religiously Unaffiliated (“none”) 68% 26% 
White Born again /evangelical 16% 81% 
Mormon 25% 61% 
Attend services weekly 40% 56% 
Monthly 46% 49% 
Few times a year 48% 47% 
Never 62% 31% 
 
 33 
Table 8. Advantages of EU membership by religion  
(Woodhead for Westminster Faith Debates/You Gov, June 2013, GB adults,  n=4018) 
 
Below are some advantages that people have identified from the UK’s membership of the European 
Union. Which, if any, of the following do you think have been ADVANTAGES of the UK's membership 
of the European Union? Please tick all that apply.  
 All None  CofE RC 
Greater ease of travel within Europe 48% 52% 45% 52% 
Increased trade and investment between 
member states  
43% 48% 38% 49% 
Easier for British people to work and 
retire elsewhere in Europe 
39% 43% 36% 39% 
Peace in Europe 33% 35% 30% 37% 
Easier to catch criminals across 
European borders 
30% 33% 28% 31% 
Stronger say in the world 24% 28% 21% 20% 
Economic strength 23% 27% 19% 20% 
Reinforcing common values 12% 15% 10% 11% 
Something else 3% 5% 1% 5% 
Not applicable - I do not think there 
have been any advantages from the 
UK's membership of the EU 
19% 17% 25% 17% 




Table 9. Disadvantages of EU membership by religion (Woodhead for Westminster Faith 
Debates/You Gov, June 2013, GB adults,  n=4018) 
 
Below are some disadvantages that people have identified from the UK’s membership of the European 
Union. Which of the following do you think have been DISADVANTAGES of the UK's membership of 
the European Union? Please tick all that apply.  
 
 
 All None  CofE RC 
Too many EU laws and regulations 
 
66% 61% 76% 64% 
Less safe borders meaning more people come 
to Britain illegally 
 
55% 49% 65% 52% 
Too many people from the rest of the EU 
coming to work in Britain 
 
54% 47% 66% 54% 
British parliament having less power 
 
53% 48% 62% 53% 
Subsidizing agriculture in other EU countries 
through the EU's Common Agricultural Policy 
 
50% 47% 59% 49% 
Undermining British values 
 
45% 
36% 58% 44% 
Too many imports into Britain from the rest of 
Europe damaging UK jobs and prosperity 
 
31% 26% 40% 26% 
Something else 5% 6% 4% 1% 
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Not applicable, I do not think there have been 
any disadvantages from the UK's membership 
of the EU 
6% 8% 3% 4% 
Don't know 10% 11% 7% 10% 
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Table 10. Logistic regression Model Summary likelihood of voting leave :  









    
 2914.79 0.09 0.12    










 Observed  voted remain voted leave    




548.43 509.60 51.83  




   63.25  
        
Table: Variables in 
the Equation 
       
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1 agegrp3 0.52 0.06 80.86 1 0.000 1.68 
 social class  0.28 0.04 48.66 1 0.000 1.33 
 CofE 0.49 0.1 21.73 1 0.000 1.63 
 London -0.47 0.13 12.91 1 0.000 0.62 
 Constant -1.59 0.15 112.72 1 0.000 0.2 
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Table: Case Processing Summary       
Unweighted Cases N Percent      
Included in Analysis 2471 89.24     
Missing Cases 298 10.76     
Total 2769 100     
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Table 11. Logistic regression Model Summary on likelihood of affiliating as CofE 









 Nagelkerke R 
Square 
   
 2450.35 0.09 0.13    
        
Table: 
 Classification Table 
       
   Predicted     




 Observed  0 1   
Step 1 Var= 
CofE 
0 1515.87 135.19 91.81  
 
  1 491.21 127.45 20.6  
 Overall Percentage   72.4  
        
Table: 
Variables in the Equation 
       
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1        
 agegrp3 0.74 0.07 126.2 1 0.0000 2.09 
 leaver 0.49 0.1 22.57 1 0.0000 1.63 
 gender 0.34 0.1 11.67 1 0.0010 1.4 
 Constant -3.34 0.22 235.18 1 0.0000 0.04 
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Unweighted Cases N Percent      
Included in Analysis 2471 89.24     
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1  See, for major examples, 
 BBC News. EU Refrendum Explained. 24th June 2016.  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
36616028 
 Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Brexit Vote Explained. 31st August 2016. 
 
 https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/brexit-vote-explained-poverty-low-skills-and-lack-opportunities 
 British Social Attitudes. Brexit, Litmus Test or Lightening Rod?  
  http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-34/brexit.aspx 
 
2   How the UK Voted on Thursday and Why. Friday 24th June. 
https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/ Data Tables at https://lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/How-the-UK-voted-Full-tables-1.pdf 
3  The first version of this paper was delivered as a keynote lecture by Woodhead at the British 
Sociological Association Study Group for Sociology of  Religion, Lancaster University, July 
2016.  
4   EU Referendum ‘How Did you Vote?’ 21-23 June 2016 n=12369, data table 15 
https://lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/How-the-UK-voted-Full-tables-
1.pdf 
5   The source of data unclear, it says: exit poll analysed ‘for Professor John Denham of the 
University of Windsor’ and  mentions a two to one preference for ‘leave among 
Episcopalians and Anglicans’, the same as our finding which had been reported in the media 
a few days before (e.g. Woodhead on Andrew Marr ‘Start the Week’, BBC Radio 4, Monday 
10th April 2017). Trevor Phillips, To Understand Brexit Look to Anglicans. Daily Telegraph, 
14th April 2017.  
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6     The Evangelical Alliance, the main body representing evangelicals in Britain, remained 
politically neutral throughout the Brexit campaign, but produced resources to enable Christians to think 
more deeply about the issues involved. It urged them to pray for the process, outcome and implications of 
the result of the referendum. See  http://www.eauk.org/current-affairs/politics/eu/a-christian-mission-
perspective-on-the-eu-referendum.cfm;   http://www.eauk.org/idea/may-jun-2016.cfm;  
 http://www.eauk.org/current-affairs/politics/eu/prayer-for-the-eu-referendum.cfm 
7  Data tables available at www.faithdebates.org.uk/research 
8  The current Archbishop of Canterbury Justin Welby, made a clear statement prior to the EU 
vote in favour of Remain: ‘Warning against ‘succumbing to our worst instincts’ over immigration, Justin 
Welby said he would vote to stay in on 23 June to avert economic damage that could harm the poorest’ 
(Guardian 2016). The other bishops followed suit. Only one is on record as supporting Brexit,  Mark 
Rylands, Bishop of Shrewsbury,  having admitted in a letter to the Church Times that he voted Leave ‘At 
my bishops’ cell group in May, I came out as a Brexit bishop. My episcopal friends, at first, did not 
believe me. The following 24 hours brought some lively conversation, mixed with a certain amount of 
gentle mocking.’  In contrast to the CofE bishops, the Evangelical Alliance, the main body representing 
evangelicals in Britain, remained politically neutral throughout the campaign, but produced resources to 
enable Christians to think more deeply about the issues involved. It urged them to pray for the process, 
outcome and implications of the result of the referendum. 
9  One of the few works in political science to address the link between populism and religion is 
the volume  edited by  Marzouki, McDonnell, and  Roy.  (2016):  Various chapters, especially those on 
Europe, and most especially the nations of the East, highlight that many of the  exclusionary right-wing 
variants of populism seem to focus on the widespread discontent with globalisation and specifically with 
the perceived threat of Islam overwhelming the ‘native’ culture of Christendom. This is not very strongly 
linked with Christian  religious belief or participation in church worship, indeed in some countries such as 
France the secular language of ‘laicite’ is equally deployed. In fact the case study from Britain (Peace 
2016) includes analysis of the Respect Party, which grew out of the Stop the War movement and appealed 
greatly to Muslim voters, alongside UKIP and the BNP (British National Party). The BNP which inherits 
a fascist and racist tradition dating back to the pre-war ‘Black-shirts of Oswald Moseley had little time or 
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love for Christianity and was repeatedly and forcefully condemned by the leaders of the major British 
churches. With the electoral demise of Respect and the BNP since 2015 and the growing irrelevance of 
UKIP since the referendum Peace's chapter seems somewhat dated, and fails to notice the emergence of 
the EDL (English Defence League) and Britain First (as populist movements rather than organized 
political parties) where the extremist rhetoric is openly anti-Islamic, and from time to time seeks to 
mobilise the symbolism and identity markers of ‘Christian England’ such as the Cross and the legend of 
the (Libyan) St George. 
 
 
